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Abstract 
Despite the evolving literature on the development benefits of mobile phones, we still know 
very little about factors that influence their adoption.  Using twenty five policy variables, we 
investigate determinants of mobile phone penetration in 49 Sub-Saharan African countries 
with data for the period 2000-2012. The empirical evidence is based on contemporary and 
non-contemporary OLS, Fixed effects, System GMM and Quantile regression techniques. The 
determinants are classified into six policy categories. They are: (i) macroeconomic, (ii) 
business/bank, (iii) market-related, (iv) knowledge economy, (v) external flows and (vi) 
human development. Results are presented in terms of threshold and non-threshold effects. 
The former has three main implications. First, there are increasing positive benefits in 
regulation quality, human development, foreign investment, education, urban population 
density and internet penetration. Second, there is evidence of decreasing positive effects from 
patent applications. Third, increasing negative impacts are established for foreign aid and 
return on equity. Non-threshold tendencies are discussed. Policy implications are also covered 
with emphasis on policy syndromes to enhance more targeted implications for worst 
performing nations.  
 
JEL Classification: C23; L96; O11; O33; O55 
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1. Introduction 
 
Many industries are currently being disrupted by the mobile phone
1
 revolution which 
is not only changing interaction networks, but also providing services to previously untapped 
niches, including banking and healthcare. Mobile applications are increasingly being 
developed to improve, inter alia: payment solutions for Small and Medium Size Enterprises 
(SMEs); greater interaction among corporations; consultation of physicians and monitoring of 
personal health and enhancement of services for the underserved people. Some of such 
services include the provision of mobile banking facilities to those previously excluded from 
formal financial services and improvement of rural health workers’ performances by means of 
mobile health applications (Asongu & De Moor, 2015).   
According to the narrative, there is an evolving stream of literature that has been 
motivated by the need for more scholarly research on the impact of mobile phones on 
development (Mpogole et al, 2008, p. 71). According to Kliner et al. (2013), mobile phones 
have been consistently improving health services delivered to rural communities. This is in 
line with the position of Kirui et al. (2013) on the benefits on mobile banking in fighting 
poverty in these communities: ‘We conclude that mobile phone-based money transfer services 
in rural areas help to resolve a market failure that farmers face; access to financial services’ 
(p. 141). This is essentially because the benefits of mobile technology are more apparent for 
the underprivileged such as  the population in rural areas (Warren, 2007). The author believes 
that rural communities would benefit most from the technology because it stifles barriers in 
the areas of ‘commodity purchase’ and ‘information acquisition’. According to Mishra and 
Bisht (2013), in many fast emerging economies and despite efforts furnished by mainstream 
financial institutions, ‘Telecommunication infrastructure growth especially mobile phone 
penetration has created an opportunity for providing financial inclusion’ (p.503).  In India, 
                                                          
1
 Mobile, mobile phones, mobile telephony and cell phones are used interchangeably throughout this study.  
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Singh (2012, p. 466) has adopted a more direct stance in acknowledging the contribution of 
‘mobile banking’ in financial inclusion. Economic opportunities have also been enhanced 
with the transformation of mobile phones into pocket banks, which have provided financial 
access to the low-income or previously unbanked strata of the population in developing 
countries (Demombynes & Thegeya, 2012; Asongu, 2013).  
As far as we have reviewed, the current literature on mobile phones can be classified 
into three main streams;  reducing the rural/urban gap, female empowerment and improving 
health services 
The first stream articulates the following. (i) Challenges of production, employment 
and distribution of food faced by rural communities. The information gap bridged by mobile 
telephony generates substantial positive externalities in terms of job creation and incremental 
income generation. For instance, studies in Ghana have shown that increased access to 
‘market information’ leads to an income surge of about 10 percent (E-agriculture, 2012, p. 6-
9). (ii) SMEs and cooperatives are supported by ‘mobile banking’-driven agricultural finance. 
This is the case in Costa Rica with financially-sustainable groups (Perez et al., 2011, p. 316) 
and Community Credit Enterprises (CCE) which foster sustainable business models. 
According to the World Bank, mobile phones are playing a crucial role in the development of 
agriculture and rural areas (Qiang et al., 2011, pp. 14-26). This is consistent with the position 
of Chan and Jia (2011) on the benefits of mobiles in facilitating rural loans, ‘mobile banking 
is an ideal choice for meeting the rural financial needs’ (p. 3) as a result of increasing ‘rates 
for bank transfers through mobile cell phones at commercial banks’ (Table 2, p. 5). (iii) As 
reported by Muto and Yamano (2009) and Aker and Fafchamps (2010), demand- and supply-
side constraints in agricultural productivity and rural livelihoods are increasingly being 
mitigated by the mobile technology, which is easing mechanisms for  ‘high-growth/return 
markets’ to farmers. The crucial issue tackled here is how the mobile is used to improve rural 
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livelihoods through better demand- and supply-matching and/or reduce wastes through 
matching networks.  
  The second strand on female empowerment provides evidence of the increasing 
participation of women in communities due to more financial inclusion. Documented 
mechanisms for greater inclusion entail, inter alia: household management and consolidation 
of small businesses (Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2016a). According to Jonathan and Camilo 
(2008), Asongu (2015a) and Ondiege (2010, 2013), mobile phones reduce the gender-finance 
gap and enable timely household responses to poverty-related shocks. Some examples, 
include: reduced cost of travelling, income saving, education, multi-tasking and management 
of household budgets (Al Surikhi,  2012; Asongu, 2015bc). Country-specific models provided 
by Ondiege (2010, p. 11) and Mishra & Bisht (2013, p. 505)  are supported by appropriate 
government policies. This is consistent with the conclusions of Ojo et al. (2012) who have 
investigated how mobile phones have affected the livelihoods of women in Ghana and Maurer 
(2008) on the caution that the role of policy-making bodies is critical in maintaining the 
gender inclusive benefits of mobile services.  
 In the third strand, we find literature on the employment of mobile phones for medical 
devices and improvement of healthcare. According to West (2013), healthcare quality and 
affordability in the world have been substantially improved. Challenges based on geographic 
and income disparities are increasingly been tackled through mobile applications that 
ameliorate healthcare delivery. Hence, by connecting patients to providers of healthcare, 
mobile phones improve on the delivery of healthcare by means of, among other things: 
laboratory tests, access to reference material and medical records. Some examples include 
designing of mobile devices for clinical appointments (Da Costa et al., 2010), observation and 
treatment of tuberculosis patients (Hoffman et al., 2010) and self-monitoring and tailored 
feedback (Bauer et al., 2010). 
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 Despite the evolving literature on the development benefits of mobile phones, we 
know very little about factors that influence the adoption of  them.  Madden and Coble-Neal 
(2004) examined the economic determinants of global mobile telephony adoption and 
concluded that price ceilings levelled in networks with fixed-line delay mobile network 
growth.  Then too, Madden et al. (2004) showed that ‘technically advanced mobile cellular 
networks’ are driving mobile adoption. Abu and Tsuji (2010) found telecom infrastructure as 
a significant determinant. Tseng and Lo (2011) assessed antecedents of intentions of 
consumers’ move to upgrade their mobile and found that they are unwilling to adopt a more 
recent generation model when they are satisfied with their usage of the current  network. 
Penard et al. (2012) assessed if cell phone adoption processes in Africa are different from 
those of other regions to establish that the principal obstacles to mobile phone use are age- 
and economically-related. Factors determining mobile phone penetration in Africa and Asia  
were examined by Doshi and Narwold (2014) using panel data for the period 2001-2012. 
They  established the following as significant determinants: population growth, rural rate, 
population density, fixed lines penetration and Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita. 
This last study is closest to the current line of inquiry in terms of sample periodicity and data 
structure.  
 The above literature on determinants leaves room for improvement in at least six main 
areas: updated evidence, more robust panel methodology, conditional determinants, 
contemporary specifications, use of more determinants and derivation of policy syndromes. 
First, the use of a data structure for the period 2000-2012 provides updated evidence to 
complement studies like Madden and Coble-Neal (2004) and Madden et al. (2004) that are 
based for the most part on data collected before the year 2000. Second, on the methodology, 
contrary to Doshi and Narwold (2014) that is essentially based on panel Fixed-effects (FE), 
this study employs a battery of panel estimation techniques that are more robust to 
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endogeneity and the behaviour of mobile phone data. Accordingly, we employ baseline 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regressions, FE estimations and a dynamic system Generalised 
Method of Moments (GMM) with forward orthogonal deviations. This last technique controls 
for cross-sectional dependence, avoids potential biases in traditional GMM techniques and 
accounts for the persistent feature in mobile phone penetration. Third, contrary to the 
underlying literature, average effects may not lead to more targeted policy implications. 
Hence, we also assess the determinants of mobile phone penetration throughout its conditional 
distribution. This enables us to distinguish between best and worst countries in terms of 
mobile penetration, such that policy lessons for least- performers are clearly articulated from 
the success of their better-performing counterparts. The intuition for this specification is that 
blanket policies may not be effective unless they are contingent on initial mobile phone 
penetration levels and tailored differently across best- and  worst-performing countries in 
mobile adoption. Fourth, in order to increase subtlety in the policy implications, the 
specifications are modelled in terms of contemporary and non-contemporary determinants. 
This facilitates the timing of mobile phone adoption policies. Fifth, as far as we know, 
determinants used in the underlying literature have not been many. For instance, Doshi and 
Narwold (2014) who have employed a comparatively large number of variables have used 
eight determinants. In this study, we use 25 determinants classified into six categories: (i) 
macroeconomic policy, (ii) bank-related, (iii) market-oriented, (iv) knowledge economy, (v) 
external flows and (vi) human development variables. Each category has at least three 
variables and specifications are tailored to mitigate potential issues of overparameterization 
and multicollinearity. Sixth, in order to enhance more focused policy implications, we 
decompose the sample into fundamental characteristics and provide  conditions on which the 
assessed determinants are most relevant.   
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 The above gaps are filled by positioning the line of inquiry on Africa for a threefold 
reason. First, Africa is experiencing a relative asymmetric development in terms of mobile 
phone and internet penetrations. Consistent with Penard et al. (2012), while within developed 
nations both penetrations have risen in tandem to a point of market saturation, the uneven 
penetration has been characterized by cell phones substantially outpacing internet deepening 
by 41 percent against 9.6 percent (as of 2010). Second, according to Micheal (2013), 
emerging markets in Africa constitute the next big business avenue because mobile phone 
adoption rates have stabilized in high-end markets like Asia, Europe and North America. 
Third, a recent World Bank report on mobile phones has shown that African countries are in 
the drivers’ seat when it comes to their usage for mobile banking activities (Mosheni-
Cheraghlou, 2013).  
Theoretical underpinnings for the adoption of a new technology have been 
substantially documented by Yousafzai et al. (2010, p. 1172). Some of the most popular 
include, the: theory of reasoned action (TRA), theory of planned behavior (TPB) and 
technology acceptance model (TAM). A common denominator among the underlying theories 
is that the mobile phone adoption process is complex and multifaceted, entailing, inter alia: 
(a) an approach from information managers and system developers that is centered on the 
customer’s formation of belief and not on the influence of attitudes and (b) crucial features 
which include composite considerations like customers’ personal, social, psychological, 
utilitarian and behavioral aspects. First, consistent with Yousafzai et al., the TRA, developed 
by Fishbein and Ajzen (1975), Ajzen and Fishbein (1980) and Bagozzi (1982) is  based on the 
assumption  that customers are rational when it comes to considering the implications of their 
actions. Second, the TPB pioneered by Ajzen (1991) has extended the TRA by articulating the 
absence of differences between customers who have a conscious control over their actions 
from those that do not. Third, the TAM developed by Davis (1989) assumes that the adoption 
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process of a given technology by a customer can be explained by the customer’s voluntary 
intention to accept and use the technology.  
 The rest of the study is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the data and 
methodology. The empirical analysis, discussion of results and implications are covered in 
Section 3. Section 4 concludes.  
 
 
2. Data and Methodology 
2.1 Data  
 We assess a panel of 49 Sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries with data from African 
Development Indicators (ADI) of the World Bank and Nguena et al. (2015) for the period 
2000-2012.The dependent variable is the mobile phone penetration rate (per 100 people). As 
we noted earlier, six main categories of independent variables are employed. They are (i) four 
macroeconomic and trade policy variables (trade openness, money supply, inflation and Gross 
Fixed Capital Formation (GFCF)); (ii) six business/bank-related indicators for investment 
incentives (Net Interest Margin (NIM), Loan Deposit Spread (LDS), Interest Rate Spread 
(IRS), Bank density, Return on Assets (ROA) and Return on Equity (ROE)); (iii) three 
market-oriented determinants  for market size, market growth and market structure (GDP 
growth, Population growth and Urban population); (iv) five indicators for the World Bank’s 
four knowledge economy index (KEI)  components (secondary school enrolment for 
education, regulation quality denoting institutional regime, patent applications for innovation, 
internet penetration representing information and communication technology (ICT) and 
private domestic credit for economic incentives); (v) three external flows (Foreign Direct 
Investment, Foreign aid and Remittances) and (vi) three human development indicators (the 
human development index (HDI), household capital expenditure and domestic savings). A 
similar set of variables has been used by Asongu (2015c) which exclusively focuses on cross-
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sectional data for the year 2011 because mobile banking data was only available for that year. 
This inquiry steers clear of Asongu (2015c) at three levels. First, findings of the underlying 
study can be simply interpreted as correlations, not causalities. This is not the case with the 
present study. Second, the underlying study focuses on mobile banking and mobile phone 
penetration for the year 2011. Third, we employ panel estimation strategies that are not 
consistent with the cross-sectional oriented line of inquiry.  
 The first-three categories are consistent with the United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development (UNCTAD, 2002) classification of economic determinants, which have 
been employed in recent literature on macroeconomic determinants (see Akpan et al., 2014; 
Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2015; Asongu & Kodila-Tedika, 2015). The choice of knowledge 
economy (KE) variables is motivated by Wang et al. (2009) who have concluded that 
knowledge is an important determinant of mobile phone adoption. While the inclusion of 
external flows is motivated by the significant positive effect witnessed during the sample 
periodicity (See Figure 1 of Ssozi & Asongu, 2015), the human development indicators are 
consistent with the underlying mobile phone literature discussed in the preceding section. 
 It is difficult to provide expected signs for the 25 variables under consideration. This is 
essentially because of the absence of prior literature that has documented the relationship 
between mobile penetration and most of the underlying variables. Hence, we shall engage our 
intuition for the expected signs concurrently with the discussion of results. The selected 
categories of determinants and definition of variables are presented in Table 1 and Table 2 
respectively.  
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Table 1: Mobile phone/banking determinants  
  
Determining Variables  Examples 
  
Policy variables (4) Trade policy, macroeconomic policy (Trade, M3, 
Inflation, GFCF)  
  
Business/Bank variables (6) Investment incentives (NIM, LSD, IRS, Bank density, 
ROA, ROE) 
  
Market-related economic determinants (3) Market size, market growth, market structure (GDPg, 
Popg, Ubanpop) 
  
 
Knowledge Economy (5) 
Education (SSE), Institutional Regime (RQ), Innovation 
(Patents), ICT (Internet), Economic incentives (Private 
credit).  
  
External Flows (3) FDI, NODA, Remi 
  
Human development (3) HDI, HHCExp, Domestic savings 
  
Source: Authors. M3: Money Supply. GFCF: Gross Fixed Capital Formation. NIM: Net Interest Margin. LSD: Loan Deposit Spread. IRS: 
Interest Rate Spread. ROA: Return on Assets. ROE: Return on Equity. GDPg: GDP growth. Popg: Population growth. SSE: Secondary 
School Enrolment. RQ: Regulation Quality.  Ubanpop: Urban population. FDI: Foreign Direct Investment. NODA: Net Official 
Development Assistance. Remi: Remittances. HDI: Human Development Index. HHCExp: Household Consumption Expenditure.  
 
  
Adopted fundamental characteristics for the policy environment are classified in terms of 
income levels (low-income, middle-income, lower-middle-income and upper-middle-income), 
legal origins (English common law and French civil law), religious dominations (Christianity 
and Islam), openness to sea (landlocked and unlandlocked), oil exports (Oil- and Nonoil-
exporting) and conflicts (conflicts and Nonconflicts). For brevity, we do not discuss the 
criteria for the determination of these characteristics, but they can be provided upon request. 
The interested reader can find the justifications in Asongu (2015cd).  
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Table 2: Variable definitions 
     
Categories Variables Signs Definitions Source 
     
Mobile phone/ 
banking 
Mobile Phone  Mobile Mobile phone subscriptions (per 100 people) WDI 
     
 
Policy variables  
Trade  Trade Imports + Exports of Good & Services (% of GDP) WDI 
Financial Depth M3 Money Supply (% of GDP) WDI 
Inflation  Infl Consumer prices (annual %) WDI 
Domestic Invt.  GFCF Gross Fixed Capital Formation (% of GDP) WDI 
     
 
 
Business & 
Bank variables  
Interest Margin NIM Net Interest Margin (%) WDI 
Loan Spread  LDS Loan-Deposit Spread (%) WDI 
Interest Spread IRS Interest Rate Spread (Lending rate minus Deposit rate, %) WDI 
Bank Density  Bbrchs Commercial bank branches (per 100 000 adults) WDI 
Bank Return 1 ROA Return on Assets (annual %) WDI 
Bank Return 2 ROE Return on Equity (annual %) WDI 
     
Market-related 
economic  
variables  
Eco. Growth  GDPg Gross Domestic Product growth rate (annual %) WDI 
Pop. Growth  Popg Population growth rate (annual %) WDI 
Urban Pop.  Ubanpop Urban Population (% of Total) WDI 
     
 
External flows  
Foreign Invt. FDI Foreign Direct Investment net inflows (% of GDP) WDI 
Remittances  Remi Remittance inflows (% of GDP) WDI 
Foreign Aid NODA Net Official Development Assistance (% of GNI) WDI 
     
 
Household 
Development  
Human dev.  HDI Human Development Index  WDI 
HC Expenditure  HCE Household Final Consumption Expenditure (% of GDP) WDI 
Domestic Savings DSav Gross Domestic Savings (% of GDP) WDI 
     
 
Knowledge 
Economy  
Education SSE Secondary School Enrolment (% of Gross) WDI 
Institutional Regime RQ Regulation Quality (Estimate) WDI 
ICT Internet Internet penetration (per 100 persons) WDI 
Eco. Incentives Credit Private credit by deposit banks and other financial institutions 
(% of GDP) 
WDI 
Innovation  Patents  Total patent applications  WDI 
     
Eco: Economic. Pop: population. Ivt: Investment. HC: Household Consumption. WDI: World Development Indicators of the 
World Bank. GNI: Gross National Income.  
 
  
Table 3 below provides the summary statistics. Two points are noteworthy. First, the 
variables in both structures are comparable (based on mean values). Second, the variables 
exhibit a substantial degree of variation so that we are confident that interesting estimated 
linkages will emerge.  
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Table 3: Summary statistics 
      
 Panel (2000-2012) 
  
 Mean Standard Deviation  Minimum Maximum Observations  
      
Mobile Phone  23.37 28.00 0.00 147.2 572 
      
Trade  78.17 36.13 20.96 209.8 597 
Financial depth (M3) 34.39 21.76 8.12 171.6 198 
Inflation  56.57 1017 -9.61 24411 577 
Domestic Investment  20.31 9.606 1.096 78.56 559 
      
Net Interest Margin(NIM) 6.946 3.756 -4.610 39.24 473 
Loan-Deposit Spread (LDS) 12.13 8.778 0.530 69.94 359 
Interest Rate Spread (IRS) 13.02 14.01 0.525 175.7 389 
Bank Density   5.236 7.872 0.129 48.28 371 
Return on Assets (ROA) 2.177 2.226 -14.91 13.47 477 
Return on Equity (ROE) 20.75 32.33 -389.3 178.6 477 
      
GDP growth rate (GDPg) 4.714 6.322 -47.55 63.38 608 
Population growth (Popg) 2.361 0.948 -1.081 6.576 588 
Urban Population (Ubanpop) 36.27 16.92 -1.175 86.45 637 
      
Foreign Direct Investment  5.33 8.73 -6.043 91.00 603 
Remittances  3.977 8.031 0.000 64.10 434 
Foreign Aid 11.68 14.19 -0.253 181.1 606 
      
Human Development Index 0.466 0.107 0.262 0.769 411 
Household Expenditure 74.02 20.16 7.12 178.1 540 
Domestic Savings 11.29 21.87 -87.53 89.62 557 
      
Secondary School Enrolment 38.52 24.31 6.077 123.8 375 
Regulation Quality  -0.715 0.644 -2.665 0.983 578 
Internet Penetration  4.152 6.450 0.005 43.60 566 
Private Domestic Credit  18.55 22.47 0.550 149.7 507 
Patents  129.9 927.7 0.000 8317 637 
      
 
Given that we are using 25 explanatory variables, it is normal to expect potential 
issues of muliticollinearity and overparameterization. In the presence of these concerns, 
variables with a high degree of substitution enter into conflict and only some emerge with the 
expected signs. Given the policy orientation of the study, policy variables take precedence 
over the aforementioned  misspecification biases. Moreover, we can also achieve the policy 
purpose while at the same time mitigating the effect of these errors by simply avoiding 
variables with a high degree of substitution in the same equation. Table 4 presents the 
corresponding correlation matrix. Correlations with a high degree of substitution are 
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highlighted in bold. Specifications in the empirical sections are tailored to avoid combination 
of highly correlated variables in the same model
2
.  
 
 
                                                          
2
 For example the following sets of variables do not enter into the same specifications: IRS & LDS, DSav & 
HCE, SSE & Internet, SSE & Credit, SSE & HDI, Patent & Credit, SSE & Bbrchs, IRS & Inflation, SSE & Popg, 
Internet & Bbrchs, HDI  & Bbrchs and HDI & Internet. ‘Interest Rate Spread’, ‘Net Interest Margin’ and 
‘Lending Deposit Rate’ cannot all enter into the same specification because of concerns about mulitcollinearity. 
Only two of the variables can be employed in a given specification. In Table 5, ‘Interest Rate Spread’ is not used 
because ‘Net Interest Margin’ and ‘Lending Deposit Rate’ are used. In Table 6, ‘Interest Rate Spread’ is not used 
because ‘Net Interest Margin’ and ‘Lending Deposit Rate’ are used. In Table  7,  Interest Rate Spread’ is used 
either with ‘Net Interest Margin’ or ‘Lending Deposit Rate’. In the light of these clarifications, the need to avoid 
concerns about multicollinearity justifies   the multitudes of specifications in the empirical results section.   
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Table 4: Correlation matrix  
                          
Policy Variables Business/Bank Variables Market-related External Flows Household  Development Knowledge Economy   
Trade M3 Infl. GFCF NIM LDS IRS Bbrchs ROA ROE GDPg Popg UPop FDI Aid Remi HDI HCE DSav SSE RQ Internet Credit Patent Mobile  
1.000 0.577 0.006 0.390 -0.10 0.106 0.042 0.266 0.028 0.027 0.097 -0.30 0.231 0.338 -0.062 0.447 0.370 -0.17 0.114 0.32 0.023 0.182 0.013 -0.074 0.243 Trade 
 1.000 0.225 0.095 -0.04 -0.25 -0.02 0.632 0.152 0.188 -0.18 -0.64 0.458 0.177 -0.464 -0.02 0.774 -0.32 0.338 0.75 0.166 0.531 0.337 0.109 0.411 M3 
  1.000 -0.08 0.25 0.539 0.70 -0.009 -0.05 -0.01 -0.07 -0.13 -0.00 -0.02 -0.007 -0.07 -0.02 0.05 -0.03 -0.04 -0.13 0.043 -0.06 -0.007 -0.028 Infl 
   1.000 -0.18 -0.07 -0.16 0.275 -0.06 0.05 0.286 0.075 -0.04 0.385 0.006 0.212 0.248 -0.30 0.278 0.11 0.264 0.119 0.029 -0.032 0.216 GFCF 
    1.00 0.142 0.118 -0.279 0.485 0.232 0.031 0.160 -0.24 -0.005 0.251 0.009 -0.37 0.339 -0.27 -0.20 -0.09 -0.223 -0.24 -0.128 -0.273 NIM 
     1.00 0.999 -0.211 -0.01 -0.04 0.033 0.309 0.074 0.160 0.104 -0.05 -0.34 -0.08 0.072 -0.30 -0.32 -0.228 -0.33 -0.165 -0.258 LDS 
      1.000 -0.141 0.065 0.014 -0.10 0.017 0.032 0.048 0.034 -0.05 -0.27 -0.009 -0.005 -0.30 -0.37 -0.122 -0.21 -0.11 -0.207 IRS 
       1.000 -0.03 0.012 -0.03 -0.50 0.116 0.006 -0.152 -0.03 0.705 -0.169 0.134 0.80 0.327 0.836 0.390 0.048 0.579 Bbrchs 
        1.000 0.489 0.061 0.044 -0.11 -0.12 0.018 0.001 0.021 0.081 -0.09 0.05 0.055 -0.092 -0.07 -0.07 -0.094 ROA 
         1.000 0.012 -0.02 -0.04 -0.07 0.009 -0.001 -0.003 -0.005 -0.018 0.034 0.050 -0.081 -0.05 -0.016 -0.051 ROE 
          1.000 0.266 -0.02 0.122 0.064 -0.002 -0.052 0.124 0.163 -0.11 0.052 -0.044 -0.06 -0.024 0.044 GDPg 
           1.000 -0.21 0.082 0.359 -0.17 -0.53 0.051 -0.02 -0.67 -0.17 -0.43 -0.38 -0.16 -0.334 Popg 
            1.000 0.134 -0.16 -0.16 0.414 -0.33 0.369 0.344 0.096 0.175 0.132 0.185 0.375 UPop 
             1.000 0.283 0.120 0.004 -0.00 0.024 0.026 -0.11 0.038 -0.09 -0.055 0.070 FDI 
              1.000 -0.009 -0.34 0.498 -0.47 -0.41 -0.21 -0.173 -0.17 -0.11 -0.220 Aid 
               1.000 -0.04 0.439 -0.57 -0.04 -0.05 -0.02 -0.07 -0.07 -0.050 Remi 
                1.000 0.426 0.400 0.899 0.503 0.663 0.514 0.204 0.690 HDI 
                 1.000 -0.94 -0.28 -0.17 -0.106 -0.08 -0.09 -0.223 HCE 
                  1.000 0.214 0.135 0.093 0.015 0.048 0.224 DSav 
                   1.000 0.470 0.703 0.622 0.354 0.699 SSE 
                    1.000 0.261 0.580 0.272 0.346 RQ 
                     1.000 0.439 0.126 0.696 Internet 
                      1.000 0.799 0.428 Credit 
                       1.000 0.246 Patent 
                        1.000 Mobile 
                          
M3: Money Supply. Infl: Inflation. GFCF: Gross Fixed Capital Formation. NIM: Net Interest Margin. LDS: Lending Deposit Spread. IRS: Interest Rate Spread. Bbrchs: Bank Density. ROA: Return on Assets. ROE: 
Return on Equity. GDPg: GDP growth. Popg: Population growth. UPop: Urban population. FDI: Foreign Direct Investment. Aid: Net Official Development Assistance. Remi: Remittance. HDI: Human Development 
Index. HCE: Household consumption expenditure. DSav: Domestic savings. SSE: Secondary School Enrolment. RQ: Regulation Quality. Internet: internet penetration. Credit: Private Domestic Credit. Patent: Total 
patent applications. Mobile: Mobile phone penetration. Potential issues of multicollinearity highlighted in bold.  
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2.2 Estimation techniques  
Four estimation techniques are adopted in order to control for a multitude of factors, notably: 
(i) baseline contemporary and non-contemporary Ordinary Least Squares; (ii) contemporary 
and non-contemporary Fixed effects (FE) regressions to control for the unobserved 
heterogeneity; (iii) the Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) to account for persistence in 
mobile phone penetration and (iv) Quantile Regressions (QR) to control for initial levels of 
mobile phone penetration. The GMM approach is motivated by persistence in mobile phone 
penetration as well as the need to also account for simultaneity and time-invariant omitted 
variables. The use of non-contemporary regressions in order to control for potential 
endogeneity bias is in accordance with recent literature (Mlachila et al., 2014, p.21; Asongu & 
Nwachukwu, 2016b).   
 
2.2.1 Determinants based on Panel OLS and Fixed-Effects  
  
Contemporary and non-contemporary Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) with Heteroscedasticity 
and Autocorrelation Consistent (HAC) standard errors are complemented with Fixed-Effects 
regressions.   
   
Baseline OLS panel regressions  
-Baseline Panel contemporary determinants (Left Hand Side (LHS) of Table 5) 
tittih
h
j
j
ti WMobile ,,,
25
1
25
1
,   
            
(1) 
Where: tiMobile ,
 
 is the Mobile phone penetration rate for country i
 
at period t ; is a 
constant,
 
W  is the vector of determinants, t is the time specific effect and ti ,  the error term .  
-Baseline Panel non-contemporary determinants (Right Hand Side (RHS) of Table 5) 
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h
j
j
ti WMobile ,1,,
25
1
25
1
,   


         
(2) 
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Eqs (1) and (2) are based on HAC standard errors, with control of the unobserved 
heterogeneity in time-effects.  
Panel fixed-effects (FE) 
-Panel FE contemporary determinants (Left Hand Side (LHS) of Table 6) 
tititih
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j
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25
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    
(3) 
Where: i  
is the country-specific effect 
-Panel FE non-contemporary determinants (Right Hand Side (RHS) of Table 6) 
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(4) 
Eqs (3) and (4) are based on HAC standard errors with control for both country-specific and 
time effects.  
 
2.2.2 Determinants based on a dynamic panel (Table 7) 
The choice of a GMM technique has at least five justifications. Whereas the first-two 
are requirements for the employment of the estimation approach, the last-three are related 
advantages. First, the technique enables the control for persistence in mobile phone 
penetration, given that the criterion for continuation of  mobile phone penetration is met. 
Accordingly, the correlation between mobile phone penetration and its first lag is 0.987 which 
is above the 0.800 criterion used to ascertain persistence in dependent variables. Second, the 
N (or 49)>T(or 13) criterion for the employment of the GMM technique is also met because 
the number of time series in each cross section is lower than the number of cross sections. 
Third, the empirical strategy accounts for endogeneity in all regressors by controlling for time 
invariant omitted variables and using instrumental values of regressors. Fourth, the system 
GMM estimator accounts for small biases in the difference GMM estimator. Fifth, cross-
country variations are considered in the specifications.   
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In essence, the system GMM estimator (Blundell & Bond, 1998; Arellano & Bond,   
1995) has been documented to have better properties than the difference estimator  of 
Arellano and Bond (1991) (see Bond et al., 2001, pp. 3-4).   
Eq. (5) and Eq (6) represent system Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) 
specifications in level and first difference respectively. The adopted GMM strategy employs 
two-step forward orthogonal deviations instead of first differences. This extension by 
Roodman (2009ab) of Arellano and Bover (1995) has been documented to provide more 
efficient estimates in the presence of cross-sectional dependence (see Love & Zicchino, 2006; 
Baltagi, 2008).   
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Where:  represents the coefficient of autoregression.   
 We now discuss exclusion and identification restrictions. Consistent with recent 
literature, all independent variables are considered as suspected endogenous or predetermined 
variables while only years are considered as strictly exogenous (Dewan & Ramaprasad, 2014; 
Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2016c). In essence, it is not likely for years to become endogenous in 
first-difference (see Roodman, 2009b). Hence, the procedure for treating ivstyle (years) is 
‘iv(years, eq(diff))’ while  the gmmstyle is adopted for predetermined or suspected 
endogenous variables.  
 In the light of the above, years or the strictly exogenous instruments affect mobile 
phone penetration exclusively via endogenous explaining or predetermined variables. 
Moreover, the statistical validity of the exclusion restriction is assessed with the Difference in 
Hansen Test (DHT) for instrument exogeneity. In essence, the null hypothesis of this test 
19 
 
should not be rejected in order for the instruments to elucidate mobile phone penetration 
exclusively through the predetermined indicators. Accordingly, while in the standard 
instrumental variable (IV) approach, a rejection of the null hypothesis of the Sargan 
Overidentifying Restrictions (OIR) test is an indication that the instruments elicit the outcome 
variable beyond the predetermined variables (see Beck et al., 2003; Asongu & Nwachukwu, 
2016d), in the GMM approach with forward orthogonal deviations, the information criterion 
used to assess if years exhibit strict exogeneity is the DHT.  Therefore, in the GMM results 
that would be reported, the exclusion restriction is confirmed if the alternative hypothesis of 
the DHT corresponding to IV (year, eq(diff)) is rejected. 
 
2.2.3 Conditional determinants based on Quantile regression 
 
 We also employ the Quantile regression (QR) technique to investigate if the 
determinants of mobile phone vary throughout the conditional distributions of mobile phone 
penetration. Hence, the intuition for this approach is that blanket policies used to boost mobile 
penetration may not be effective unless they are contingent on initial levels of mobile phone 
penetration and tailored differently across best-performing and worst -performing countries. 
In this light, lessons drawn from the former nations could be applied to the latter countries, in 
terms of significant determinants of the dependent variable. The adopted QR which is 
consistent with the underpinnings of Keonker and Hallock (2001) is increasingly being 
employed in development literature (Billger & Goel, 2009; Okada & Samreth, 2012; Asongu, 
2014ab).    
The  th quantile estimator of the dependent variable is derived after estimating Eq. (7) 
below.  
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Where  ∈ (0, 1). Contrary to OLS in Eq. (1) that is based on minimizing the sum of squared 
residuals; the weighted sums of absolute deviations are minimized in this approach and k 
stands for number of explanatory variables. For example, the 75
th
 or 25
th
 quantiles ( =0.75 or 
0.25 respectively) are obtained by weighing the residuals approximately. The conditional 
quantile of dependent variables ( iy ) given the determinants ( ix ) is: 
 iiy xxQ )|(                                                                                      (8) 
Where, unique slope parameters are estimated for each  th quantile (mobile phone 
penetration). The formulation of Eq. (8) is analogous to ixxyE )|( in the slope of Eq. 
(1), though parameters are modeled only at the mean of conditional distributions of the 
variables to be explained. In Eq. (7), the dependent variable iy  is a mobile phone penetration 
indicator, while  ix  contains a constant term and the determinants.  
 
3. Empirical results  
3.1 Determinants of Mobile phone penetrations  
 In this section, we present the findings for baseline OLS (Table 5), Fixed-effects 
(Table 6) and System GMM (Table 7) regressions. For Tables 5-6, the LHS and RHS 
respectively represent contemporary and non-contemporary specifications. In the latter 
specifications, the determinants are lagged by one period.  The specifications are tailored to 
avoid potential issues of multicollinearity and overparameterization from the correlation 
analysis.  
 In Table 5, the information criteria for the validity of specifications are the Fisher 
statistics and the Adjusted Coefficient of determination (R²). It is apparent that the 
specifications are all valid at the 1percent significance level. Moreover, corresponding R² are 
above 0.500, which further confirms the explanatory power of the investigated determinants. 
The following findings can be established. First, from the category of macroeconomic policy 
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variables (i) the effects of trade openness, money supply and domestic investment are mixed 
while (ii) inflation has a positive influence on the dependent variables, with a lower 
magnitude in the non-contemporary specification. Second, concerning the business/bank 
related indicators: (i) the effects of net interest margin and lending deposit rate are mixed, (ii) 
the impacts of bank density and ROA are positive while (iii) the effect of ROE is negative. 
Third, regarding market-related indicators, (i) the effect of GDP growth is contradictory 
whereas (ii) the impacts of population growth and urban population are positive. Fourth, on 
external flows,  the impact of foreign aid, foreign investment and remittances are respectively 
varied, positive and negative. Fifth, for household development, the human development 
index  has a positive effect compared with the negative correlation observed for domestic 
savings. The impact of household expenditure is insignificantly different from zero. Sixth, 
with regard to the incidence of knowledge economy, education, regulation quality and internet 
penetration exert positive influence on mobile phone diffusion whereas the effects of private 
credit and patent applications are not statistically significant.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
22 
 
 
Table 5: Baseline OLS with HAC SE 
              
  Contemporary Non-contemporary 
              
 Constant  114*** 29.52*** -239*** -23.70 -18.99 -25.24 140*** 29.17*** -190*** -21.91 -21.96 -28.21 
  (0.000) (0.001) (0.003) (0.136) (0.197) (0.201) (0.000) (0.002) (0.003) (0.178) (0.165) (0.201) 
 
 
 
Policy 
Variables 
Trade 0.58 --- -1.3*** --- --- -0.047 0.89* --- -0.87** --- --- -0.051 
 (0.165)  (0.001)   (0.484) (0.096)  (0.012)   (0.424) 
Money Supply -1.35** --- 0.624* --- --- --- -1.39** --- 0.53** --- --- --- 
 (0.018)  (0.058)    (0.020)  (0.034)    
Inflation  0.651 --- 3.36*** --- --- --- -0.54 --- 1.71*** --- --- --- 
 (0.537)  (0.006)    (0.463)  (0.006)    
Domestic  Investment -1.95** --- 2.01*** --- --- 0.170 -2.7*** --- 1.06*** --- --- 0.123 
 (0.033)  (0.001)   (0.718) (0.000)  (0.000)   (0.828) 
 
 
 
 
Business/ 
Bank 
Variables   
Net Interest Margin -4.7*** -1.47* 2.92** --- --- 0.043 -4.5*** -1.17 2.28** --- --- 0.206 
 (0.000) (0.085) (0.012)   (0.965) (0.000) (0.188) (0.045)   (0.850) 
Lending Deposit Rate -1.42 -0.45** 1.38** --- --- -0.74** -2.18* -0.44*** 0.188 --- --- -0.70* 
 (0.170) (0.015) (0.045)   (0.041) (0.064) (0.008) (0.744)   (0.075) 
Bank  Density  6.43** 2.01*** 4.42*** --- --- --- 5.328* 2.13*** 2.92*** --- --- --- 
 (0.016) (0.000) (0.005)    (0.099) (0.000) (0.003)    
Return on Assets -4.73 1.59 6.71*** --- --- -0.259 -2.88 0.908 9.68*** --- --- -0.351 
 (0.244) (0.332) (0.008)   (0.644) (0.51) (0.587) (0.000)   (0.526) 
Return on Equity  0.103 -0.18 -0.9*** --- --- -0.039 -0.09 -0.132 -1.1*** --- --- -0.027 
 (0.785) (0.178) (0.000)   (0.543) (0.840) (0.326) (0.000)   (0.698) 
 
 
Market-
related  
GDP growth  --- -0.98*** 2.84*** --- --- -0.36* --- -0.97*** 1.564 --- --- -0.239 
  (0.000) (0.043)   (0.081)  (0.000) (0.154)   (0.311) 
Population growth  --- -0.25 34.8*** --- --- --- --- -0.46 35.2*** --- --- --- 
  (0.926) (0.004)     (0.868) (0.002)    
Urban  population  --- 0.502*** 3.82*** --- --- 0.286 --- 0.56*** 3.64*** --- --- 0.295 
  (0.001) (0.000)   (0.185)  (0.001) (0.000)   (0.194) 
 
 
External 
Flows  
Foreign Investment  --- --- --- 0.362* 0.38*** 0.439 --- --- --- 0.654 0.515 0.404 
    (0.077) (0.001) (0.390)    (0.179) (0.118) (0.538) 
Foreign Aid --- --- --- 0.015 -0.15* 0.512* --- --- --- 0.024 -0.155 0.569 
    (0.918) (0.070) (0.092)    (0.891) (0.136) (0.128) 
Remittances  --- --- --- -0.193 -0.48* -0.384 --- --- --- -0.182 -0.481* -0.220 
    (0.287) (0.055) (0.327)    (0.333) (0.051) (0.594) 
 
House- 
hold 
Develo- 
pment 
Human Development --- --- --- --- 100.7** --- --- --- --- --- 115*** --- 
     (0.015)      (0.008)  
Household expenditure --- --- --- 0.217 --- --- --- --- --- 0.199 --- --- 
    (0.213)      (0.242)   
Domestic Savings  --- --- --- --- -0.28** -0.388 --- --- --- --- -0.26** -0.274 
     (0.029) (0.153)     (0.032) (0.303) 
 
 
 
Knowled
ge 
Economy 
Education  --- --- --- 0.77*** --- 1.10*** --- --- --- 0.82*** --- -12.42 
    (0.000)  (0.000)    (0.000)  (0.238) 
Regulation Quality  --- --- --- 1.67 1.590 -12.05 --- --- --- 1.71 0.500 1.18*** 
    (0.645) (0.714) (0.195)    (0.669) (0.912) (0.000) 
Internet penetration  --- --- --- --- 1.57*** --- --- --- --- --- 1.68*** --- 
     (0.000)      (0.000)  
Private Credit  --- --- --- --- 0.129 --- --- --- --- --- 0.115 --- 
     (0.243)      (0.303)  
Patent  Applications  --- --- --- 0.0004 --- -0.001 --- --- --- 0.0008 --- -0.001 
    (0.500)  (0.498)    (0.245)  (0.522) 
              
Adjusted R² 0.785 0.606 0.929 0.502 0.574 0.585 0.78 0.623 0.963 0.531 0.562 0.581 
Fisher  10.7*** 37.38*** 27.5*** 37.1*** 41.0*** 14.5*** 10.1*** 35.95*** 52.2*** 38.4*** 34.5*** 13.6*** 
Cross Sections  6 30 6 37 38 22 6 30 6 36 38 22 
Observations  25 190 25 251 238 145 24 170 24 232 210 138 
              
OLS with HAC SE: Ordinary Least Squares with Heteroscedascticity and Autocorrelation Consistent Standard Errors.  ***; **; *: significant 
levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. P-values in parentheses.  
 
 
 Table 6 below is based on panel FE controls for unobserved heterogeneity in terms of 
country-specific effects. The information criteria for the validity of specifications are: Within 
R², Least Square Dummy Variable (LSDV) R² and LSDV Fisher. It is apparent that the 
specifications are all valid at the 1 percent  significance. Moreover, the corresponding Within 
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R² and LSDV R², are above 0.700, which further confirms the explanatory power of the 
investigated determinants.  
First, consistent with the OLS findings in Table 5, (i) the impacts of trade openness, 
money supply and domestic investment are mixed and (ii) the previously positive effect of 
inflation is now negative. Second, (i) the previously diverse effects of net interest margin and 
lending-deposit rate are now persistently negative, (ii) the impact of bank deposit is 
consistently positive while the effect of ROA is now negative and (iii) the formerly negative 
impact of ROE is now no longer clear-cut. Third, the mixed and positive signs of market-
related variables are consistent with the baseline OLS findings. Fourth, (i) the previously 
mixed effects of foreign aid are no longer significant, (ii) the sign of foreign investment 
changes to negative while (iii) the negative impact of remittances remains unchanged. Fifth, 
on household development variables, only the human development index remains positively 
significant because whereas the insignificant incidence of household expenditure is 
maintained, the negative effect of domestic savings is no longer significant. Sixth, on 
knowledge economy, (i) education and internet penetration still display positive signs whereas 
regulation quality now has a negative influence and (ii) the previously insignificant effects of 
private credit and patent applications are now positive.  
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Table 6: Panel Fixed-Effects  
              
  Contemporary Non-contemporary 
              
 Constant  -28.65 -432*** -468*** -85.8*** -216*** -96.68 99.94** -464*** -636*** -100*** -232*** -167** 
  (0.375) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.109) (0.012) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.013) 
 
 
 
Policy 
Variables 
Trade 1.05*** --- 0.315 --- --- -0.22*** 0.30*** --- 0.104 --- --- -0.20* 
 (0.000)  (0.112)   (0.008) (0.007)  (0.796)   (0.074) 
Money Supply -0.11* --- 0.191* --- --- --- 0.16*** --- 0.298 --- --- --- 
 (0.071)  (0.076)    (0.000)  (0.174)    
Inflation  -0.27 --- -0.34 --- --- --- -0.27** --- -0.64 --- --- --- 
 (0.384)  (0.558)    (0.024)  (0.302)    
Domestic  
Investment 
-1.01 --- -0.971 --- --- 1.22*** -2.03** --- -2.59*** --- --- 1.33*** 
 (0.239)  (0.354)   (0.000) (0.015)  (0.000)   (0.000) 
 
 
 
 
Business/ 
Bank 
Variables   
Net Interest 
Margin 
-
1.22*** 
-0.89* -2.65 --- --- -1.42** -1.16 -0.42 -2.02*** --- --- -1.30*** 
 (0.003) (0.052) (0.185)   (0.000) (0.318) (0.316) (0.000)   (0.002) 
Lending Deposit 
Rate 
-2.030 0.104 -2.68 --- --- -1.68*** -
6.32*** 
0.196 -3.98* --- --- -1.64*** 
 (0.249) (0.688) (0.184)   (0.000) (0.003) (0.372 (0.077)   (0.000) 
Interest Rate 
Spread  
--- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
             
Bank  Density  10.6*** 3.89** 2.96** --- --- --- 6.39*** 3.68*** -1.49 --- --- --- 
 (0.000) (0.012) (0.025)    (0.000) (0.006) (0.205)    
Return on Assets -1.55 0.632 -9.6*** --- --- 0.328 6.50 -0.58 -3.89 --- --- 0.461 
 (0.539) (0.556) (0.008)   (0.193) (0.117) (0.453) (0.186)   (0.143) 
Return on Equity  0.150 -0.04 0.78** --- --- -0.017 -0.78** 0.05 0.27 --- --- 0.0001 
 (0.470) (0.585) (0.013)   (0.670) (0.049) (0.445) (0.172)   (0.997) 
 
 
Market-
related  
GDP growth  --- 0.21 1.435* --- --- -0.86*** --- 0.029 0.667 --- --- -0.78*** 
  (0.235) (0.064)   (0.000)  (0.854) (0.425)   (0.000) 
Population growth  --- 1.62 -35.18 --- --- ---- --- 1.43 19.49** --- --- --- 
  (0.804) (0.105)     (0.824) (0.032)    
Urban  population  --- 12.0*** 17.27*** --- --- 1.547 --- 12.9*** 22.09*** --- --- 3.54* 
  (0.000) (0.000)   (0.391)  (0.000) (0.000)   (0.085) 
 
 
External 
Flows  
Foreign 
Investment  
--- --- --- 0.306 0.139 -0.496* --- --- --- 0.377 0.104 -0.425* 
    (0.312) (0.362) (0.062)    (0.360) (0.748) (0.090) 
Foreign Aid --- --- --- 0.185 -0.051 -0.002 --- --- --- 0.127 -0.056 -0.029 
    (0.285) (0.502) (0.989)    (0.588) (0.545) (0.872) 
Remittances  --- --- --- -0.187 -
0.75*** 
-0.060 --- --- --- -0.16 -
0.90*** 
0.010 
    (0.431) (0.000) (0.814)    (0.488) (0.005) (0.972) 
 
House- 
hold 
Develo- 
pment 
Human 
Development 
--- --- --- --- 493*** --- --- --- --- --- 540*** --- 
     (0.000)      (0.000)  
Household 
expenditure 
--- --- --- 0.054 --- --- --- --- --- 0.130 --- --- 
    (0.839)      (0.600)   
Domestic Savings  --- --- --- --- -0.341 -0.286 --- --- --- --- -0.35 -0.29 
     (0.152) (0.221)     (0.109) (0.197) 
 
 
 
Knowledg
e 
Economy 
Education  --- --- --- 2.51*** --- 2.06*** --- --- --- 2.8**** --- 2.08*** 
    (0.000)  (0.000)    (0.000)  (0.000) 
Regulation 
Quality  
--- --- --- -3.627 0.922 -17.8*** --- --- --- -9.34 -7.51 -21.4*** 
    (0.736) (0.934) (0.003)    (0.402) (0.551) (0.004) 
Internet 
penetration  
--- --- --- --- 1.34*** --- --- --- --- --- 1.40** --- 
     (0.000)      (0.012)  
Private Credit  --- --- --- --- 0.97** --- --- --- --- --- 0.871* --- 
     (0.021)      (0.060)  
Patent  
Applications  
--- --- --- 0.01*** --- 0.009*** --- --- --- 0.009**
* 
--- 0.007*** 
    (0.000)  (0.000)    (0.000)  (0.000) 
              
LSDV R² 0.983 0.909 0.995 0.857 0.859 0.929 0.798 0.926 0.998 0.869 0.866 0.933 
Within R² 0.859 0.713 0.963 0.715 0.725 0.825 0.798 0.712 0.976 0.712 0.716 0.831 
LSDV Fisher  42.9*** 41.4*** 96.06*** 28.91*** 26.0*** 39.6*** 42.2*** 44.9*** 203*** 29.8*** 23.6*** 39.2*** 
Cross Sections 6 30 6 37 38 22 6 30 6 36 38 22 
Observations  25 190 25 251 238 145 24 170 24 232 210 138 
              
OLS with HAC SE: Ordinary Least Squares with Heteroscedascticity and Autocorrelation Consistent Standard Errors.  ***; **; *: significant levels 
at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. P-values in parentheses. 
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 The dynamic system GMM results are presented in Table 7 below. Four principal 
information criteria are employed to assess the validity of the GMM model with forward 
orthogonal deviations 
3
. 
Looking at the findings, but for bank density and urban population, (i) the human 
development index and education are consistently positive in Tables 5-7 across specifications 
and (ii) the signs of the other variables are conflicting.    
 
Table 7:  Dynamic System GMM with Forward Orthogonal Deviations  
         
 Dependent Variable: Mobile Phone Penetration Rate 
         
 Mobile (-1) 1.10*** 1.038*** 1.156*** 0.973*** 1.003*** 1.107*** 1.051*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 Constant  -1.289 -4.313* 0.070 -3.216 -25.47*** -0.885 1.399 
  (0.576) (0.053) (0.980) (0.479) (0.000) (0.498) (0.374) 
 
 
 
Policy 
Variables 
Trade 0.043** --- --- --- ---   
 (0.011)       
Inflation  -0.013 --- -0.015** --- --- --- --- 
 (0.548)  (0.049)     
Domestic  Investment 0.079 --- 0.054 --- --- --- --- 
 (0.210)  (0.315)     
 
 
 
 
Business/ 
Bank 
Variables   
Net Interest Margin -0.34** --- -0.265** --- --- --- --- 
 (0.026)  (0.042)     
Lending Deposit Rate 0.005 ---  --- --- --- --- 
 (0.925)       
Interest Rate Spread  --- --- 0.042 --- --- --- --- 
   (0.171)     
Bank  Density  --- 0.155*  --- --- --- --- 
  (0.084)      
Return on Assets --- 0.293 -0.188 --- --- --- 0.047 
  (0.109) (0.242)    (0.515) 
Return on Equity  --- -0.018  --- --- -0.010  
  (0.405)    (0.298) --- 
 
 
Market-
related  
GDP growth  --- 0.113*** --- --- --- ---  
  (0.001)     --- 
Population growth  --- 0.695 --- --- --- ---  
  (0.207)      
Urban  population  --- 0.195*** --- --- --- --- 0.143*** 
  (0.000)     (0.000) 
 
 
External 
Flows  
Foreign Investment  --- --- --- 0.037 0.054*** 0.074* -0.061 
    (0.333) (0.000) (0.095) (0.242) 
Foreign Aid --- --- --- -0.014 0.021*** 0.041*** 0.040*** 
    (0.490) (0.005) (0.006) (0.003) 
Remittances  --- --- --- -0.058** --- 0.082 0.104** 
    (0.011)  (0.239) (0.038) 
 
House- 
hold 
Develo- 
Human Development --- --- --- --- 68.13*** --- --- 
     (0.000)   
Household expenditure --- --- --- 0.003 --- --- --- 
    (0.955)    
                                                          
3
 “First, the null hypothesis of the second-order Arellano and Bond autocorrelation test (AR(2)) in difference for 
the absence of autocorrelation in the residuals should not be rejected. Second the Sargan and Hansen 
overidentification restrictions (OIR) tests should not be significant because their null hypotheses are the 
positions that instruments are valid or not correlated with the error terms. In essence, while the Sargan OIR test 
is not robust but not weakened by instruments, the Hansen OIR is robust but weakened by instruments. In order 
to restrict identification or limit the proliferation of instruments, we have ensured that instruments are lower 
than the number of cross-sections in most specifications. Third, the Difference in Hansen Test (DHT) for 
exogeneity of instruments is also employed to assess the validity of results from the Hansen OIR test. Fourth, a 
Fischer test for the joint validity of estimated coefficients is also provided” (Asongu & De Moor, 2016, p.9). 
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pment Domestic Savings  --- --- --- --- 0.002 0.056* -0.004 
     (0.899) (0.097) (0.880) 
 
 
 
Knowledge 
Economy 
Education  --- --- --- 0.150*** --- --- --- 
    (0.000)    
Regulation Quality  --- --- --- --- -1.921** -0.029 2.223 
     (0.032) (0.984) (0.104) 
Internet penetration  --- --- --- --- -0.237*** --- --- 
     (0.000)   
Private Credit  --- --- --- --- -0.085*** --- --- 
     (0.000)   
Patent  Applications  --- --- --- -0.0005**** --- 0.0005** --- 
    (0.000)  (0.030)  
         
AR(1) (0.003) (0.001) (0.004) (0.073) (0.026) (0.000) (0.001) 
AR(2) (0.490) (0.383) (0.455) (0.604) (0.677) (0.473) (0.482) 
Sargan OIR (0.601) (0.008) (0.632) (0.038) (0.144) (0.005) (0.062) 
Hansen OIR  (0.949) (0.374) (0.691) (0.790) (0.652) (0.386) (0.480) 
DHT for Instruments         
(a) Instruments in levels        
H excluding group (0.516) (0.112) (0.738) (0.299) (0.678) (0.169) (0.312) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.977) (0.692) (0.531) (0.930) (0.412) (0.608) (0.569) 
(b) IV (years, eq (diff))        
H excluding group (0.680) (0.209) (0.928) (0.554) (0.395) (0.078) (0.370) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.947) (0.696) (0.370) (0.840) (0.782) (0.980) (0.573) 
        
Fisher 12578*** 2882*** 36726*** 1.05e+06*** 22335*** 6.68e+07*** 10053*** 
Instruments 33 34 33 41 41 40 40 
Countries 29 41 30 36 44 37 37 
Observations  248 285 251 249 261 305 305 
         
***,**,*: significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments’ Subsets. Dif: 
Difference. OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions Test. The significance of  bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated 
coefficients, Hausman test and the Fisher statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: (a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) & 
AR(2) tests and (b) the validity of the instruments in the Sargan OIR test. P-values in parentheses. 
 
 
Two main reasons could be advanced for these differences. First, while OLS neither 
controls for  time- nor country-effects, Fixed-effects (system GMM) control for country-
specific effects (both country- and time-effects). Second, the specifications are sensitive to 
sample periodicity, such that the sign and magnitudes of estimated coefficients are contingent 
on observations available in the sample consistent with a given specification. One way to 
tackle these issues is to adopt an estimation technique that consistently employs the same 
observations across specifications. We adopt a Quantile Regression (QR) approach because, 
in addition to tackling the underlying estimation  problem, it also allows us to assess the 
determinants throughout the conditional distributions of mobile phone penetration. This 
enables us to distinguish the determinants in poor-performing countries from those of their 
better-performing counterparts.  
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3.2 Panel Conditional Determinants  
 
 Table 8 below consists of 6 different specifications that are tailored to mitigate 
potential multicollinearity issues identified in Table 4. The information criterion for the 
validity of specifications is the Pseudo R². It is apparent that the specifications are worthwhile 
because the explanatory powers are fairly high. Accordingly, in percentage terms, very few 
coefficients of adjustment are less than 10 percent. It is interesting to note that some QR 
studies exclusively rely on the significance of estimated coefficients for the validity of 
specifications(see Okada & Samreth, 2012).   
While, contemporary and non-contemporary results are almost identical, what is quite 
interesting with respect to previous findings from Tables 5-7 is that the OLS findings 
significantly change when the dependent variable is assessed throughout its conditional 
distributions. This justifies our intuition for adopting this estimation technique in order to 
address the issues arising from preceding regressions. The following findings can be 
established.   
On the first specification (i) the negative effect of trade is apparent only the 0.50
th
 and 
0.75
th
 quantiles while that of inflation is visible only in the 0.10
th
 and 0.90
th
 quantiles, (ii) 
domestic investment has a positive impact in the 0.50
th
 and 0.75
th
 quantiles whereas we find a 
threshold evidence on the effect of education with a positive magnitude increasing from the 
0.10
th
 to the 0.75
th
 quantile.  
Second, the following are observable for the second specification. (i) The negative 
effects of net interest margin and lending-deposit rate in the OLS specification are 
fundamentally driven by the 0.75
th
 and 0.90
th
 quantiles of the conditional distribution. (ii) The 
positive effect of bank density is consistent across the distribution in a wave-like trend, while 
the impact of ROE is negative with an increasing magnitude up to the 0.75
th
 quantile.  
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Third, (i) while growth displays a negative effect at the 0.90
th
 quantile, there is  
evidence of positive  threshold impacts from urban population and internet penetration from 
the 0.25
th
 to 0.90
th
 quantile and 0.10
th
 to 0.75
th
 quantile respectively.  (ii) The negative effect 
of remittances is driven only by the 0.75
th
 quantile while the positive impact of private credit 
has a Kuznets shape in bottom quantiles (0.10
th
 to 0.50
th
).   
Fourth, thresholds are also apparent for: (i) regulation quality and human development 
with positive increasing magnitudes throughout the distributions; (ii) foreign investment with 
positive growing magnitudes from the 0.10
th
 to the 0.75
th
 quantiles; (iii) foreign aid with 
increasing negative magnitude from the 0.10
th
 to the 0.50
th
 quantile and (iv) patent 
applications with positive decreasing magnitudes throughout the distribution (with the 0.75
th
 
quantile insignificant).  
 
Table 8: Panel Conditional determinants of Mobile phone penetration 
             
 Contemporary Non-contemporary 
   
 OLS Q 0.10 Q 0.25 Q 0.50 Q 0.75 Q 0.90 OLS Q 0.10 Q 0.25 Q 0.50 Q 0.75 Q 0.90 
             
Constant  -7.523** -5.72*** -4.641** -7.73*** -7.154 4.114 -7.523** -5.72*** -4.641** -7.73*** -7.154 4.114 
 (0.031) (0.000) (0.013) (0.000) (0.113) (0.481) (0.031) (0.000) (0.013) (0.000) (0.113) (0.481) 
Trade  -0.016 -0.005 -0.003 -0.061*** -0.085** 0.064 -0.016 -0.005 -0.003 -0.061*** -0.085** 0.064 
 (0.719) (0.609) (0.849) (0.000) (0.048) (0.336) (0.719) (0.609) (0.849) (0.000) (0.048) (0.336) 
Inflation -0.032 -0.04*** -0.001 0.013 0.003 -0.089** -0.032 -0.04*** -0.001 0.013 0.003 -0.089** 
 (0.266) (0.000) (0.921) (0.442) (0.916) (0.025) (0.266) (0.000) (0.921) (0.442) (0.916) (0.025) 
Domestic Investment  0.191 0.039 0.015 0.176** 0.300* 0.073 0.191 0.039 0.015 0.176** 0.300* 0.073 
 (0.210) (0.426) (0.837) (0.014) (0.089) (0.780) (0.210) (0.426) (0.837) (0.014) (0.089) (0.780) 
Education  0.722*** 0.243*** 0.33*** 0.723*** 1.036*** 0.963*** 0.722*** 0.243*** 0.331*** 0.723*** 1.03*** 0.96*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Fisher  59.10*** --- --- --- --- --- 59.10*** --- --- --- --- --- 
Adjusted/Pseudo R² 0.421 0.074 0.147 0.248 0.323 0.359 0.421 0.074 0.147 0.248 0.323 0.359 
Observations  320 320 320 320 320 320 320 320 320 320 320 320 
             
 OLS Q 0.10 Q 0.25 Q 0.50 Q 0.75 Q 0.90 OLS Q 0.10 Q 0.25 Q 0.50 Q 0.75 Q 0.90 
             
Constant  45.56*** 4.002 12.39*** 33.28*** 78.25*** 94.02*** 45.56*** 4.002 12.39*** 33.28*** 78.2*** 94.0*** 
 (0.000) (0.213) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.213) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Net Interest Margin -2.157* -0.110 -0.448 -1.435 -3.58*** -4.118** -2.157* -0.110 -0.448 -1.435 -3.58*** -4.11** 
 (0.054) (0.743) (0.237) (0.133) (0.001) (0.013) (0.054) (0.743) (0.237) (0.133) (0.001) (0.013) 
Lending Deposit Rate -0.368* -0.025 -0.033 -0.166 -0.599** -0.70*** -0.368* -0.025 -0.033 -0.166 -0.59** -0.70*** 
 (0.067) (0.710) (0.783) (0.559) (0.044) (0.004) (0.063) (0.710) (0.783) (0.559) (0.044) (0.004) 
Bank Density  2.212*** 2.29*** 2.22*** 2.49*** 1.865*** 2.651*** 2.212*** 2.296*** 2.229*** 2.492*** 1.86*** 2.65*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Return on Equity  -0.105 -0.085*** -0.12*** -0.158 -0.26*** -0.247** -0.105 -0.085*** -0.129*** -0.158*** -0.26*** -0.24** 
 (0.231) (0.000) (0.000) (0.143) (0.007) (0.034) (0.230) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.007) (0.040) 
Fisher  52.08*** --- --- --- --- --- 52.08*** --- --- --- --- --- 
Adjusted/Pseudo R² 0.514 0.289 0.305 0.316 0.370 0.383 0.514 0.289 0.305 0.316 0.370 0.383 
Observations  194 194 194 194 194 194 194 194 194 194 194 194 
             
  OLS Q 0.10 Q 0.25 Q 0.50 Q 0.75 Q 0.90 OLS Q 0.10 Q 0.25 Q 0.50 Q 0.75 Q 0.90 
             
Constant  -4.893 -1.017 -0.387 -3.131* -3.056 6.473 -4.893 -1.017 -0.387 -3.131* -3.056 6.473 
 (0.398) (0.256) (0.414) (0.071) (0.402) (0.239) (0.398) (0.256) (0.414) (0.071) (0.402) (0.239) 
GDP growth  0.029 0.043 0.029 0.083 -0.083 -0.439** 0.029 0.043 0.029 0.083 -0.083 -0.43** 
 (0.841) (0.365) (0.225) (0.227) (0.500) (0.018) (0.841) (0.365) (0.225) (0.227) (0.500) (0.018) 
Population growth  -0.053 0.034 -0.237 -0.005 -0.703 -2.408 -0.053 0.034 -0.237 -0.005 -0.703 -2.408 
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 (0.974) (0.906) (0.111) (0.991) (0.498) (0.117) (0.974) (0.906) (0.111) (0.991) (0.498) (0.117) 
Urban  population  0.464*** 0.015 0.047*** 0.199*** 0.626*** 0.964*** 0.464*** 0.015 0.047*** 0.199*** 0.62*** 0.96*** 
 (0.000) (0.154) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.154) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Internet penetration  2.771*** 2.059*** 2.626*** 3.186*** 3.644*** 3.474*** 2.771*** 2.059*** 2.626*** 3.186*** 3.64*** 3.47*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Fisher  171.8*** --- --- --- --- --- 171.8*** --- --- --- --- --- 
Adjusted/Pseudo R² 0.556 0.173 0.315 0.392 0.420 0.451 0.556 0.173 0.315 0.392 0.420 0.451 
Observations  545 545 545 545 545 545 545 545 545 545 545 545 
             
 OLS Q 0.10 Q 0.25 Q 0.50 Q 0.75 Q 0.90 OLS Q 0.10 Q 0.25 Q 0.50 Q 0.75 Q 0.90 
             
Constant  37.41*** 2.736*** 9.10*** 23.78*** 54.96*** 80.42*** 37.41*** 2.736*** 9.10*** 23.78*** 54.9*** 80.4*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Foreign Investment  0.971*** 0.640*** 0.729*** 0.987*** 1.558*** 0.853*** 0.971*** 0.640*** 0.729*** 0.987*** 1.55*** 0.85*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.008) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.008) 
Foreign Aid -0.391* -0.082*** -0.147*** -0.205* -0.325 -0.307 -0.391* -0.082*** -0.14*** -0.205* -0.325 -0.307 
 (0.091) (0.000) (0.000) (0.067) (0.211) (0.422) (0.091) (0.000) (0.000) (0.067) (0.211) (0.442) 
Remittances  -0.238* -0.028 -0.018 -0.163 -0.541 -0.437 -0.238* -0.028 -0.018 -0.163 -0.54** -0.437 
 (0.080) (0.582) (0.832) (0.391) (0.048) (0.131) (0.080) (0.582) (0.832) (0.391) (0.048) (0.131) 
Regulation Quality  17.25*** 2.866*** 7.194*** 13.70*** 26.04*** 29.13*** 17.25*** 2.866*** 7.194*** 13.70*** 26.0*** 29.1*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Fisher  21.38*** --- --- --- --- --- 21.38*** --- --- --- --- --- 
Adjusted/Pseudo R² 0.172 0.046 0.071 0.096 0.119 0.158 0.172 0.046 0.071 0.096 0.119 0.158 
Observations  392 392 392 392 392 392 392 392 392 392 392 392 
             
 OLS Q 0.10 Q 0.25 Q 0.50 Q 0.75 Q 0.90 OLS Q 0.10 Q 0.25 Q 0.50 Q 0.75 Q 0.90 
             
Constant  -54.0*** -27.9*** -37.6*** -46.5*** -59.7*** -61.8*** -54.0*** -27.9*** -37.6*** -46.5*** -59.7*** -61.8*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Human Development  188.5*** 73.60*** 120.6*** 171.4*** 226.0*** 263.0*** 188.5*** 73.6*** 120.6*** 171.4*** 226*** 263*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Domestic Savings  -0.045 0.012 -0.052 -0.011 0.004 0.054 -0.045 0.012 -0.052 -0.011 0.004 0.054 
 (0.530) (0.824) (0.310) (0.847) (0.955) (0.547) (0.530) (0.824) (0.310) (0.847) (0.955) (0.574) 
Regulation Quality  -0.013 -1.804 1.743 3.751 -1.975 -1.302 -0.013 -1.804 1.743 3.751 -1.975 -1.302 
 (0.996) (0.485) (0.468) (0.147) (0.585) (0.788) (0.996) (0.485) (0.468) (0.147) (0.585) (0.788) 
Patent  Applications 0.003*** 0.008*** 0.006*** 0.003*** 0.001 0.002** 0.003*** 0.008*** 0.006*** 0.003*** 0.001 0.001** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.306) (0.017) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.306) (0.017) 
Fisher  79.00*** --- --- --- --- --- 79.00*** --- --- --- --- --- 
Adjusted/Pseudo R² 0.486 0.101 0.204 0.285 0.361 0.383 0.486 0.101 0.204 0.285 0.361 0.383 
Observations  331 331 331 331 331 331 331 331 331 331 331 331 
 OLS Q 0.10 Q 0.25 Q 0.50 Q 0.75 Q 0.90 OLS Q 0.10 Q 0.25 Q 0.50 Q 0.75 Q 0.90 
             
Constant  -48.3*** -23.4*** -37.8*** -46.7*** -54.9*** -59.7*** -48.3*** -23.4*** -37.8*** -46.7*** -54.9*** -59.7*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.005) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.005) (0.001) (0.001) 
Human Development  159.4*** 59.43*** 100.9*** 148.9*** 204.9*** 243.0*** 159.4*** 59.43*** 100.9*** 148.9*** 204.9*** 243*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Household 
expenditure 
0.046 -0.024 0.011 0.042 0.061 0.125 0.046 -0.024 0.011 0.042 0.061 0.125 
 (0.533) (0.619) (0.842) (0.640) (0.451) (0.239) (0.533) (0.619) (0.842) (0.640) (0.451) (0.239) 
Regulation Quality  0.712 -0.723 -0.445 0.525 2.766 5.580 0.712 0.723 -0.445 0.525 2.766 5.580 
 (0.844) (0.754) (0.887) (0.900) (0.490) (0.293) (0.844) (0.754) (0.887) (0.900) (0.490) (0.296) 
Private Credit  0.217*** 0.296*** 0.374*** 0.290*** 0.101 0.051 0.217*** -0.723 0.374*** 0.290*** 0.101 0.051 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.291) (0.721) (0.000) (0.754) (0.000) (0.001) (0.291) (0.721) 
Fisher  69.71*** --- --- --- --- --- 69.71*** --- --- --- --- --- 
Adjusted/Pseudo R² 0.486 0.107 0.229 0.303 0.362 0.369 0.486 0.107 0.229 0.303 0.362 0.369 
Observations  291 291 291 291 291 291 291 291 291 291 291 291 
             
Notes. Dependent variable is Mobile Phone Penetration. *,**,***, denote significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Lower 
quantiles (e.g., Q 0.1) signify nations where the Mobile Phone Penetration is least. P-values in parentheses. 
 
 
3.3 Policy syndromes based on fundamental characteristics  
 
According to Fosu (2013), policy syndromes are situations that have been detrimental 
to economic prosperity. These include, inter alia: ‘state controls’, ‘state breakdown’, 
‘suboptimal inter temporal resource allocation’ and ‘administered redistribution’. The author 
uses ‘syndrome free’ to qualify a situation where such features are absent or substantially 
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missing. The policy syndromes are documented to have been the fundamental cause of post-
independence poor economic performance in SSA countries. In this context, we are consistent 
with Asongu (2015f) who has used fundamental characteristics of African development in the 
analysis of knowledge economy gaps between Africa and South Korea. In the comparative 
context, high deviations from knowledge economy (KE) benchmarks are ‘policy syndromes’ 
(PS) whereas low dispersions display a ‘syndrome-free’ (SF) tendency. In this study, PS are 
fundamental characteristics with higher deviations from benchmarks or their best-performing 
counterparts whereas SF represents corresponding fundamental characteristics with the lower 
deviations.  
As shown in Table 9 below, Panel A presents the averages of the fundamental 
characteristics while Panel B shows corresponding PS and SF features. The transition from 
the LHS to the RHS denotes decreasing dispersions from the benchmark, hence indicating the 
relevance of decreasing need for policy intervention.   
 
Table 9:  Policy syndromes based on fundamental characteristics   
                
Panel A: Panel Averages  
                
Income Levels Legal Origins Religion Landlockedness Oil exporting Conflicts Full  
MI LMI UMI LI English French  Christ Islam  LL NLL Oil NonOil Conflict Noncon. Sample  
26.55 29.08 22.81 21.65 21.59 24.52 21.25 27.59 23.23 23.44 19.47 24.16 18.51 25.01 23.37  
                
Panel B: Panel Policy Syndromes   
Policy  Syndromes ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Syndrome Free  
Conflict Oil Christ LI English UMI LL Sample NLL NonOil Noncon French  MI Islam LMI Mobile  
           Low  ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ High  
   
                
MI: Middle Income. UMI: Upper Middle Income. LMI: Lower Middle Income.  LI: Low Income. English: English Common law. French: 
French Civil law. Christ: Christian. LL: Landlocked. NLL: Not Landlocked. NonOil: Non Oil Exporting. Oil: Oil Exporting. Conflict: 
Conflict-Affected. Non-Conflict Affected.  
 
 
3.4 Further discussion of results and policy implications   
 
 From the established findings, results from Quantile Regressions are more relevant to 
policy than those from OLS, Fixed Effects and GMM, essentially because they are based on 
conditional distributions of mobile phone penetration. In essence, whereas estimation by OLS, 
Fixed Effects and GMM are at the mean value of mobile phone penetration, those by the QR 
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technique show countries with low, intermediate and high levels of mobile phone penetration. 
Furthermore, policy implications based on mean values of mobile phone penetration are 
unlikely to succeed unless they are contingent on existing levels of mobile phone penetration 
and tailored differently across countries with intermediate, low and high levels of mobile 
phone penetration.  
To the best of our knowledge, only Doshi and Narwold (2014) in the underlying 
literature on mobile phone determinants have employed one of the 25 determinants used in 
this study. The population growth variable is neither significant in the aforementioned study 
nor in the conditional determinant assessments of the present paper. Thus, in what follows, we 
discuss the results in the light of intuition and policy implications. Hence, the resulting 
insights are expositional.    
 
3.4.1 Non threshold effects 
 The non-threshold effects can be summarised as follows:  (i) the negative effects of 
trade and inflation on mobile phone penetration are restricted to the 0.50
th
 and 0.75
th
 and 
0.10
th
 and 0.90
th
 quantiles respectively; (ii) the positive impact of domestic investment is 
apparent only in the 0.50
th
 and 0.75
th
 quantiles; (iii) the negative impacts of net interest 
margin and lending-deposit rate are driven by the 0.75
th
 and 0.90
th
 quantiles; (iv) bank density 
is consistently positive across the distribution in a wavelike manner; (v) the negative effect of 
growth is only apparent in the 0.90
th
 quantile;  (vi) the negative effect of remittances is 
exclusively in the 0.75
th
 quantile and (vii) the positive effect of private credit has a Kuznets 
shape in the  bottom quantiles (0.10
th
 to 0.50
th
). 
 The following implications are noteworthy for the non-threshold effects. First, the 
restricted negative effects of trade and inflation imply that (i) neither countries with low initial 
levels of mobile penetration nor those with the highest should be concerned about the effect of 
trade openness and (ii) increasing consumer price inflation is an issue only in countries at the 
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extremities of the distributions. Second, the limited effect of domestic investment implies that 
countries with low initial levels in the dependent variable need to tailor investment policies 
towards increasing the use of mobile phones. Third, the fact that the negative impacts of net 
interest margin and lending-deposit rate are driven by top quantiles implies that countries with 
low rates of mobile phones need not worry about this negative effect.   
Fourth, we have observed that bank density is consistently positive across the 
distribution in a wavelike pattern. This may indicate that banks are used as complementary 
commodities in the accomplishment of certain mobile phone services such as mobile-banking 
related activities. According to Jonathan and Camilo (2008) and Asongu (2013a, p. 8), mobile 
phones can be used to fulfil three main services that are directly linked to a bank account. 
They are to (a) store  value or currency in a bank account that is accessible by a handset and 
in cases where users are already in possession of bank accounts, it becomes a concern of 
linking the mobile service to the existing bank account. (b) convert  money into and out of the 
account and (c) transfer cash between accounts.  
Fifth, the negative effect of economic growth has been established in the highest 
quantile. Two policy implications are noteworthy. On the one hand, economic prosperity does 
not necessarily drive mobile phone penetration. On the other , in countries with very high 
initial levels of mobile phone penetration, economic growth could decrease the usage of 
mobile phones. While the former scenario could be explained by disequalizing distribution of 
national wealth, the latter may be the result of people diverting to substitutes of mobile 
penetration, which has the potential of negatively affecting mobile usage. For the first case, 
since mobile phone penetration has been established to be pro-poor, the documented unequal 
wealth distribution in SSA during the sampled periodicity could explain the insignificant 
effect (Blas, 2014). In the second case, the abundance of mobiles may urge users to recourse 
to second-hand alternatives, even with burgeoning economic prosperity.   
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Sixth, the positive effect of remittances in a top quantile may imply that the use of 
mobile phones to receive money does not engender to need for more mobile phones. This is 
essentially because many mobile phones may not be needed per customer for the remittances 
purposes. Moreover, such transactions are not of high frequency, like other daily transactions.  
Seventh, we have observed that private credit has positive effects in the bottom 
quantile or in countries where existing penetration of mobiles is low. A logical implication is 
that the availability of credit facilities is associated with activities that engender the need for 
mobile phones when their usage is low, especially for economic related transactions.   
 
3.4.2 Threshold effects 
 
The threshold effects are discussed in three main strands: positive increasing magnitude; 
decreasing positive magnitude and increasing negative magnitude. It is important to note that, 
evidence of the first strand responds to the crucial question of why some countries are more 
advanced than others in mobile phone penetration.   
First, there is evidence of positive increasing magnitude or thresholds in: (i) regulation 
quality and human development throughout the distributions; (ii) foreign investment (0.10
th
  
to the 0.75
th
 quantile); (iii) education (between the 0.10
th
  and 0.75
th
 quantiles); (iv) urban 
population density (0.25
th
 to the 0.90
th
 quantile) and (v) internet penetration (between the 
0.10
th
 and 0.75
th
 quantiles). 
This implies that best-performing SSA countries are more advanced in mobile 
penetration rate because of increasing: regulation, human development, foreign investment, 
education, urban population density and internet penetration. Hence, the benefits of these 
factors in stimulating mobile usage increases with initial levels of mobile phone usage. These 
benefits are relevant in decreasing order from the ‘policy syndrome’ to ‘syndrome free’ 
fundamental characteristics presented in Table 9, notably: Conflict, Oil-exporting, Christian, 
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Low-income, English common law, Upper-middle-income, Landlocked, Not landlocked, 
Nonoil-exporting, Non conflict, French civil law, Middle Income, Islam and Lower-middle-
income countries. 
 Second, with the slight exception of the 0.75
th
 quantile, threshold evidence of 
decreasing positive magnitude is apparent in patent applications throughout the mobile phone 
distributions. As a policy implication, sampled countries need to work towards mitigating the 
potentially decreasing benefits of mobile phone penetration from patent applications.  
Third, increasingly negative effects are also established for the (i) impact of foreign 
aid between the 0.10
th
 and 0.50
th
 quantiles and (ii) effect of ROE up to the 0.75
th
 quantile. As 
a policy implication, foreign aid would need to be tailored more towards improving the 
benefits of foreign aid in mobile usage.  
 
4. Conclusion  
 
Despite the evolving literature on the development benefits of mobile phones, we still know 
very little about factors that influence their adoption. This study has contributed to existing 
literature by elucidating why some sub-Saharan African countries are more advanced in 
mobile phone penetration.  Using twenty five policy variables, we have investigated 
determinants of mobile phone penetration in 49 Sub-Saharan African countries with data for 
the period 2000-2012. The empirical evidence is based on OLS, Fixed effects, System GMM 
with forward orthogonal deviations and Quantile regressions techniques. The determinants are 
classified in six policy categories, notably: macroeconomic, business/bank, market-related, 
knowledge economy, external flows and human development. The results are presented in 
terms of threshold and non-threshold effects.  
With regard to threshold effect, first there is evidence of positive increasing magnitude 
in (i) regulation quality and human development throughout the distributions; (ii) foreign 
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investment (0.10
th
  to the 0.75
th
 quantile); (iii) education (between the 0.10
th
  and 0.75
th
 
quantiles); (iv) urban population density (0.25
th
 to the 0.90
th
 quantile) and (v) internet 
penetration (between the 0.10
th
 and 0.75
th
 quantiles). This aspect of threshold effect addresses 
the policy concern of why some countries are more advanced in mobile phone penetration. 
Hence, there are increasing positive benefits in regulation quality, human development, 
foreign investment, education, urban population density and internet penetration. Second, with 
the slight exception of the 0.75
th
 quantile, threshold evidence of decreasing positive 
magnitude is apparent in patent applications throughout  mobile phone distributions. Hence, 
there is evidence of decreasing positive effects from patent applications. Third, increasingly 
negative effects are also established for the: (i) impact of foreign aid between the 0.10
th
 and 
0.50
th
 quantiles and (ii) effect of ROE up to the 0.75
th
 quantile. As an implication, foreign aid 
would need to be tailored more towards improving its benefits in mobile usage.  
 In terms of non-threshold effects: (i) the negative impact of trade and inflation on 
mobile phone penetration are restricted to the 0.50
th
 and 0.75
th
 and 0.10
th
 and 0.90
th
 quantile 
respectively; (ii) the positive impact of domestic investment is apparent only in the 0.50
th
 and 
0.75
th
 quantiles; (iii) the negative impacts of net interest margin and lending-deposit rate are 
driven by the 0.75
th
 and 0.90
th
 quantiles; (iv) bank density is consistently positive across the 
distribution in a wavelike pattern; (v) the negative effect of growth is only apparent in the 
0.90
th
 quantile;  (vi) the negative effect of remittances is exclusively in the 0.75
th
 quantile and 
(vii) the positive effect of private credit has a Kuznets shape in the bottom quantiles (0.10
th
 to 
0.50
th
). 
 Policy implications are discussed with specific emphasis on  the worst- and best-
performing countries in mobile phone penetration. We also provide policy syndromes based 
on fundamental characteristics to enhance more targeted implications for least-performing 
nations. Given the recently documented asymmetry between mobile phone penetration and 
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mobile banking activities by the World Bank (Mosheni-Cheraghlou, 2013), investigating 
thresholds of mobile banking is an interesting future research direction.   
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